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Introduction 
 
Ethics and integrity have become important 
topics in myriad social and policy spheres as 
well as in diverse scientific disciplines and 
bodies of knowledge. These aspects of 
governance without doubt also play a significant 
role in good governance research and policy 
making. This paper addresses integrity and ethics 
within the context of good governance, 
concentrating on a number of questions central to 
the inquiry into ethics and integrity in politics 
and administration, both national and 
international, with a focus on countries in the 
Caribbean.  
 
First, the focus is on concepts (§ 2). What is the 
meaning of such central concepts as good 
governance, ethics, integrity, morality, values, 
and corruption? Special attention will be paid to 
integrity and ethics of governance. The following 
paragraph addresses the views on ‘good 
governance’, which puts ‘integrity’ in context of 
managing competing values (democracy, 
lawfulness, effectiveness and integrity).  
 
Next, data about the reputation of Caricom 
countries on good governance are presented (§ 
4). How do they score on the distinguished 
criteria and how do the countries perform 
compared to other Caricom countries? The data 
are contested, but also offer ‘food for thought’ 
for research and policy-making. The last part of 
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 This paper briefly summarizes the conceptual 
framework that was promised in the proposal, 
but I decided to pay more attention to the 
situation and possible policies in the Caribbean, 
primarily based on desk research. Such content 
seems more relevant for SIDSGG than focusing 
primarily on conceptual and theoretical issues. 
See for a more extended reflection on concepts: 
Huberts, 2010. 
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the paper builds on that, focusing on integrity of 
governance and anti-corruption policies (§ 5). 
What ideas might result from research on the 
working of anti-corruption initiatives in the rest 
of the world? With some ‘makamba’ reluctance, 
I finish with the idea that a Caribbean Integrity 
System (CIS) initiative might be possible and 
useful. 
 
Integrity of Governance 
  
What is the exact meaning of such related 
concepts as good governance, integrity, values, 
morals, ethics, and corruption, and how should 
they be defined? The following section provides 
brief definitions as a basis for the framework that 
underpins our analysis (Huberts et al., 2008). 
Integrity is viewed as a characteristic or quality 
of accordance with the relevant moral values and 
norms. For example, (public) officials act with 
integrity if their conduct is in harmony or 
accordance with relevant moral values and 
norms (including laws and rules). However, 
which values, norms, laws, and rules are relevant 
depends on the context. Moreover, even though 
individuals are the obvious agents that can act 
with or without integrity, this characteristic or 
quality can also be applied to other ‘objects’. 
That is, whereas very specific individual conduct 
can be judged in terms of integrity (e.g., 
appointing a family member, falsifying 
documents to boost profits), the object can also 
be a group, organisation, or even a society. 
Hence, when relevant moral values and norms 
can be distinguished for such an object, integrity 
judgments can occur and the group, organisation, 
or society may be seen to lack integrity, for 
example when its leaders and members abuse 
power and appear corruptible.  
 
A value is a belief or quality that contributes to 
judgments about what is good, right, beautiful, or 
admirable, and thus weights the choice of action 
by both individuals and collectives. It is 
therefore less specific than a norm, which signals 
whether something is good or bad, right or 
wrong, beautiful or ugly. For conduct, norms 
answer the question ‘what is the correct thing to 
do?’ Nevertheless, not all values and norms are 
relevant for integrity judgements; because 
integrity is not concerned with what is beautiful 
(aesthetics), what is conventional (etiquette), or 
what works (technology). Hence, our discussion 
concentrates on ‘moral’ norms and values.  
 Moral refers to what is right or wrong or good or 
bad and therefore involves the values and norms 
people feel rather strongly about, usually because 
they are important for the community to which 
they belong (i.e. there is a claim to more general 
validity and conformity). Thus, the terms 
‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ are both used to refer to 
what is right or wrong or good or bad, and the 
terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ are often used 
interchangeably (Frederickson & Ghere, 2005; 
Lawton & Doig, 2006; Thompson, 1995). 
Nevertheless, some scholars see morals as 
referring to the principles of right and wrong and 
ethics as the study of those principles. 
Whichever the definition, these ideas depend 
heavily on the concept of wrong, under which 
rubric corruption usually falls. 
 
Corruption, whether defined broadly or 
narrowed down to such actions as bribery, refers 
to the misuse of authority to gain the favours or 
benefits offered by external parties with an 
interest in past, present, or future decision-
making. Much of the public debate, policy-
making, and theory development in ethics on an 
international level is focused on the concept of 
corruption rather than on ethics or integrity. 
Corruption violates integrity standards, but there 
is more conduct that is violating the ‘moral 
framework’ of functionaries. At VU University 
we use a typology that distinguishes between 10 
types of violations
3
:  
 
Corruption (bribing, favouritism by 
supervisors, favouritism by employees), 
fraud, theft, conflict of interest (through 
gifts or jobs), improper use of authority, 
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 Based on an analysis of the relevant literature 
on police integrity and corruption (e.g., Alatas, 
1990; Benaissa, 1993; Caiden, 1988; 
Heidenheimer, Johnston, & Levine 1989; 
Klitgaard, 1988), and its evaluation against the 
results of empirical research on internal police 
force investigations, leading to a first typology, 
used and tested in empirical research in different 
public organizations, and validated (Lasthuizen, 
2008; also Kolthoff 2007). The typology 
explicitly incorporates violations of the law, 
violations of moral norms and values (both 
formal and informal), and functional violations 
within an organization, including off-duty 
misconduct, activities that serve private personal 
interests, and misconduct in favor of the 
organization (‘noble cause corruption’) (Lamboo 
2005). 
misuse and manipulation of 
information, indecent treatment of 
colleagues or citizens and customers 
(discrimination, sexual harassment, 
other indecent treatment), waste and 
abuse of organisational resources, and 
private time misconduct.  
 
For every type of integrity violation, more or less 
serious forms of conduct are distinguishable, 
dependant on their distance from the norms and 
values. For example, the amount of private gain 
or money involved in bribery can vary 
enormously and sexual harassment can range 
from a sexist remark to rape. Not only is 
corruption in the form of bribery a crime in many 
countries, as conduct that violates the relevant 
moral values and norms, it is generally 
considered a serious integrity violation. 
Nevertheless, what is seen as a violation depends 
on the relevant norms and values and thus on the 
context (in time and place). 
 Table 1: Definition of a Number of Concepts 
  
Integrity: characteristic or quality that refers to accordance with the relevant moral values and 
norms. 
Relevant: valid within the context. 
Moral: characteristic of right or wrong, good or bad (general and unavoidable). 
Morals: the collection of moral values and norms which provides a framework for judging 
and acting. 
Ethics  1 synonymous with morals; 
            2 the systematic reflection on morality. 
Value: belief or quality that contributes to judgments about what is good, right, beautiful or 
admirable. 
Norm: prescription on what is correct in a certain situation. 
Integrity violation: conduct that violates the relevant moral values and norms 
Corruption: the abuse of entrusted power (both in the private and public sectors) for improper 
goals (private gain in a broad sense). 
 
 
Ethics and Integrity 
 
The exact relation between ‘ethics’ and 
‘integrity’ is a confusing one for several reasons. 
First, clear and consistent usage of the concept of 
integrity and its relation to ethics is hindered by 
the fact the English noun ‘integrity’ lacks an 
adjective equivalent to the Dutch integer, French 
intègre, and German integer. It is therefore 
common to speak about the integrity of a 
politician or a police officer but very unusual to 
refer (like Carter, 1996) to an integer person, 
politician, or police officer. The result is a 
marked preference for such phrases as ‘ethical 
conduct’ rather than ‘integer conduct’.  
 
Another contributing factor is people’s tendency 
to connect ethics (and its implicit connotations) 
with the ‘basics’ of policy but ‘integrity’ with 
actual behaviour. For example, although it seems 
quite natural to judge a policy on ethics (in terms 
of right or wrong, good or bad), when assessing 
the conduct of politicians and civil servants, we 
find integrity the most appropriate yardstick. We 
then talk, for example, about the integrity of a 
president or the lack of integrity of the Houses of 
Parliament in the UK (e.g., the expenses 
scandal). 
 
To bring some conceptual clarity, Figure 1 
outlines a view on the relationship between 
ethics and integrity. Here, policy ethics, which 
addresses the ethical aspects of policy and 
decision content, focuses on the ‘goodness’ and 
or ‘badness’ of the output or outcome of policy- 
and decision-making processes. Scholars in the 
enormously broad field of policy ethics tend to 
reflect on such life and death topics as abortion 
and euthanasia, medical care, nuclear energy, 
war and peace, biodiversity, food safety (genetic 
manipulation), and human stem cell research.  
 
Figure 1:  Policy ethics, and the ethics and integrity of governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC ETHICS 
& INTEGRITY INTEGRITY OF 
GOVERNANCE 
Policy process, 
action, behavior 
(how it is decided, 
implemented) 
POLICY ETHICS 
Policy decision, 
output, outcome 
(what is decided, 
implemented) 
 
 However, when we discuss ‘integrity’, the focus 
is not on policy content (output and outcome) but 
on the process of government or governance 
leading to a policy.
4
 Put bluntly, a decision to go 
to war or refrain from it, like the choice of more 
liberal or more conservative policies on abortion, 
can be made with or without integrity. Thus, 
integrity is at stake, and subject to possible 
violation, whenever government functionaries 
are involved in preparing, taking and 
implementing decisions. Do conflicts of interest 
exist because of promised campaign funds, for 
example? Do only specific lobbyists or interest 
groups have access to decision-makers? Is the 
law in accordance with the promises made 
during election time?  
 
The distinction between policy ethics and 
integrity is related to the different aspects and 
phases of the policy-making and implementation 
processes, which are often modelled in terms of 
agenda setting and formulation, decision-
making, implementation, and evaluation of 
policies.  
 
Every phase of the process can be related to the 
ethics and integrity of the involved actors and/or 
policy. Just to mention one example: US 
President Barack Obama’s agenda setting on 
ethics resulted on his first full day in office 
(January 21, 2009) in executive orders that put in 
place ethics guidelines for staff members of his 
administration. These orders – concentrate on 
lobbyists’ influence in Washington, the 
‘revolving doors’ that carry special interest 
influence in and out of the government.
5
  Or in 
other words: Obama started with the integrity of 
agenda setting and policy development.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates what different categories of 
ethics and integrity can to be distinguished, 
based on a number of the mentioned dimensions. 
The first dimension is the content of policy 
decisions versus the formulation and 
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 There are clear parallels with the extensive 
discussion on types of justice: procedural justice, 
which involves the fairness of decision-making 
processes; distributive justice, which concerns 
fairness in the distribution of rights or resources; 
and corrective justice, adressing fairness in the 
rectification of wrongdoings (Treviño, & 
Weaver, 2001). 
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 See, for example, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Ex
ecutiveOrder-EthicsCommitments/ 
implementation of these decisions.  The second 
is policy formulation and decision-making 
versus the implementation of policy decisions. 
The third is ethics as the relevant moral values 
and norms versus integrity as behaving in 
accordance with these moral values, norms and 
rules.  
 
Grand ethics concerns the ethics of policy 
content. Is the policy content ethically 
acceptable? Is it right or wrong, good or bad to 
support the ‘war against terrorism’, to give 
national priority to the fight against organised 
crime, et cetera.  
 
Integrity is about the behavior of the politicians 
and public servants involved in preparing, 
making and implementing those policy choices. 
Integrity concerns the question whether that 
behavior is in accordance with the relevant moral 
values and norms for that behavior.  
 Figure 2:  Grand, elite and street-level ethics and integrity in policy 
ETHICS POLICY  SECTOR             INTEGRTY
CONTENT POLICY 
GRAND ETHICS
invading Iraq?
security or privacy?
POLICY 
SECTOR 
ETHICS
POLICY 
SECTOR 
INTEGRITY
HOW TO MAKE AND TAKE 
DECISIONS AND POLICIES
ELITE
ETHICS
POLICY
(DECISION) 
MAKERS
ELITE 
INTEGRITY
(STREET-LEVEL) 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF POLICIES
STREET-LEVEL
INTEGRITY
HOW TO IMPLEMENT 
DECISIONS AND POLICIES
IMPLEMENTATION
ETHICS
 
The same distinctions are relevant for other than 
the public sector. For business, corporate ethics 
concerns the content of strategies and policies 
(and products), corporate integrity the moral 
quality of the decision-making processes at all 
levels (Six et al., 2007). 
   
Good Governance 
 
Ethics and integrity of governance address the 
morality of those who govern and implement 
rather than evaluating the quality of the decision 
or policy.  How does integrity relate to ‘good 
governance’?  
 
There are many different interpretations of the 
concept ‘good governance’ (De Graaf et al. 
2011
6
). One interpretation primarily stems from 
business administration and business practices, 
stimulated by scandals, Enron, Parmalat, Ahold 
etc.. The good governance then focused on the 
internal distribution of power and authority that 
was responsible for the failures as well as the 
lacking accountability towards and involvement 
of the many stake-holders. This resulted in new 
rules and institutions (US) or in extensive self-
regulation (e.g. Netherlands and Tabaksblatt 
code). Good governance then is ‘corporate 
governance’ with another division of power and 
accountability; it is more about power than about 
morals and ethics.
7
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(Eds.), Good Governance Special of the Journal 
Bestuurskunde, to be published Summer 2011. 
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 Mark Moore’s  (1995) related focus on the 
public sector’s responsibility to create Public 
Another, second vision on good governance 
focuses more on the principles or standards or 
values. Many principles and values are put 
forward then. Some point at the (constitutional) 
rules and principles of law, others add values as 
for example legitimacy, democracy, transparency 
and openness, responsiveness, accountability, 
integrity, sustainability
8
, equitability, 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
Thompson points at financial, legal, or 
democratic principles (Thompson 2001: 79, 91), 
the UN states that good governance is 
participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, 
effective and efficient and it follows the rule of 
law. The World Bank collects information on 
indicators of governance, implicitly pointing at 
what is good or bad (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
                                                                   
Value states that organizations should reflect on 
their mission, legitimacy (stake-holders) and 
organization in a coherent way. 
8
 Goede (2009) for example points at 
sustainability as crucial for good governance. On 
the one hand this value refers to the content of 
decisions and policies (with as buzz words 
ecology, climate etc.). On the other hand it points 
at a neglected aspect of the process of 
governance (in all phases): is the interest of 
‘future generations’ represented in those 
processes? Food for thought for the quality of 
governance criterion ‘responsiveness and 
democracy’:  can we limit ourselves to present 
stake-holders. 
 Mastruzzi, 2009)
9
: The six dimensions of 
governance are: 1 Voice and Accountability 
(incl. participation and freedom rights); 2. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence; 3. 
Government Effectiveness (services, civil 
service, policy process); 4. Regulatory Quality 
(policy formulation and implementation, 
promotion of private sector development; 5. Rule 
of Law (incl. the quality of the police and the 
courts) and 6. Control of Corruption. 
 
Another model is presented in Figure 3, trying to 
combine values in a number of central criteria 
(based on Bovens et al., 2001).  
Good governance criteria then concern 
democracy, lawfulness, effectiveness and 
integrity. It is clear that integrity is 
interconnected with democracy, lawfulness and 
economy, but the attractiveness of the framework 
as a heuristic device is that it points out a number 
of dilemmas in the study of the integrity of 
governance. Such a model enables practitioners 
and scholars to reflect more systematically on the 
limitations as well as possibilities of the 
mentioned criterions, including integrity.
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 The six dimensions of governance will be 
explained more in detail later in this paper, when 
the Caricom scores are presented.  
Figure 3: Quality of governance criteria 
 
responsiveness, democracy   effectiveness, efficiency 
 
 
good governance by 
public servants and politicians 
 
 
lawfulness     integrity, morality 
 
 
 
Criticism and alternative views 
 
The criticism on this type of modeling good 
governance often is that 1. the selected values are 
linked to specific often western-centered ideas 
about governance, serving the interests of those 
nations and international organizations. and 
2.that decision-makers in all countries and 
contexts always are confronted with dilemmas 
and tensions between mentioned values, while 
models suggest there might be a  harmonious 
mix of the values in actual governance.  
 
The first argument points at the possibility 
and/or desirability of seeking global consensus 
on what constitutes ethical political and public 
administrations. Since much of the existing 
research in this area was derived from Western 
thought, the frameworks may or may not 
represent the political and social best practices of 
the rest of the world (Benaissa 1993; Punch et al. 
1993; Pieth and Eigen 1999). While the moralist 
approach contends that all corruption is 
undesirable, the functionalist approach argues 
that there are conditions when bribing and 
corruptive acts are good for a society and that 
political, economic, and social relationships 
might suffer if such behaviors are extinguished 
(Johnson 2004, p. 155-163; Bardhan 1997).  
 
On the question of who are the beneficiaries of 
such efforts, one group states it is a win-win 
outcome for everyone from rich industrialized 
nations to developing countries. The other side 
states that institutions like the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund contribute to 
the development of a global free market 
capitalism which ultimately harms the poor and 
powerless and, thus, address the ethicality of 
forcing a developing country in the direction of a 
market economy and private enterprise 
(Heidenheimer and Johnston 2005; Pieth and 
Eigen 1999; UNDP 1998). Doubt also exists 
regarding the purity of interest in anti-corruption 
efforts from countries with varying political 
agendas, from developing nations where 
dictators control public funds to international 
super powers who use their economic might for 
political and military ends. Many very corrupt 
countries were among the first to ratify the UN 
Convention Against Corruption ... (Huberts et al. 
2008).  
 
In my view many transitional and developing 
countries offer examples of the subjectivity of 
the presented frameworks. ‘Western values’ are 
prominent, starting from the idea that a liberal 
democracy and a free market are good, including 
the separation of politics and administration, 
between the state and society, between the public 
and the private. No private gain from public 
power is the central element in the struggle 
against corruption. However, many countries 
offer examples of political and administrative 
systems with interrelationships between the 
mentioned spheres. The moral values and norms 
that apply to types of connectedness, favoritism 
and patronage also differ. How to deal with the 
manifold interpretations and beliefs concerning 
good governance? 
 
A possible perspective is related to the 
acknowledgement of the fact that there is by 
definition tension between the values that are 
relevant for good governance (argument 2) and 
that the ‘best way out’ will differ in different 
contexts. 
 
Though proponents of relating the good of 
governance to moral values are often criticized 
for that, almost no one of the scholars in this 
field support the idea that all values can be 
consistently and coherently (or harmoniously) 
realized in decision-making and implementation. 
Tension, conflict and choice are dominant. There 
is no single best outcome. 
 Some then come to a relativistic position: all 
depends on context, nothing can be said about 
the relative importance of values (stereotyped as 
‘anything goes’). Others are ‘pluralistic’, 
recognizing the variation of values as well as the 
normative character of all proposed ‘ways out’, 
but at the same time involved to try to sketch 
what matters more and less in the context 
reflected upon (Spicer, 2010: value pluralism; 
Huberts, 2010b). 
 
As a consequence, an important element of good 
governance then is that it is important to take 
into account ‘managing the tension between 
values’. In value pluralism, for example 
integrity, is an important aspect of good 
governance, but the context can justify that for 
example favoritism is taken for granted, 
temporarily, because it helps the effectiveness 
and/or legitimacy of policies. That position does 
not make favoritism morally acceptable, but it 
acknowledges that abolishing it might have 
negative or even devastating consequences for 
other values.    
 
The distinction between different criteria is also 
important because the credibility of them is 
interconnected. A government that starts a 
campaign against corruption and installs new 
corruption fighting bodies, but that is violating 
the rule of law, and/or is not democratic and 
legitimate and/or is unable to operate effectively, 
cannot expect that the proclaimed campaign is 
taken serious. This relates to what In ‘t Veld 
(2006) called ‘virtue as prosthesis for 
governance’.  
 
Good Governance in Caricom Countries 
 
Good governance concerns coping with 
democracy and responsiveness, lawfulness, 
effectiveness and efficiency and integrity and 
morality. This makes it interesting and 
challenging to try to find out how states in 
different parts of the world perform concerning 
those criteria and values. This paragraph will 
present some data on Caricom countries, more 
specifically I will summarize the scores on the 
World Governance Indicators, a project of 
researchers of primarily the World Bank 
((Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009). Their 
project is admired as well the object of serious 
criticism, because they primarily rely on existing 
surveys among business people and firms, non 
governmental organizations, risk analyst and 
citizens/households. As a consequence, the data 
primarily concern the perception of the 
reputation of countries (which might be different 
form the actual state of affairs). 
 
The World Governance Indicators (WHI) project 
reports composite measures of six dimensions of 
governance: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law 
and Control of Corruption.
10
 What follows is 
information about the four criteria that were 
selected as central values for good governance: 
Integrity (in WGI control of  corruption),  
Democracy (Voice and Accountability), 
Effectiveness (Government Effectiveness) and 
Lawfulness (Rule of Law).  
 
Table 2 presents the WGI information that is 
available for 2009 for a number of Caricom 
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 The six dimensions of governance are: 1. 
Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 2. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) 
– capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 3. 
Government Effectiveness (GE) – capturing 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 4. 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6. 
Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
 countries.
11
 The percentage points at the relative 
position of the 11 most populated Caricom 
countries. The higher the percentage, the better 
the score. A ’90-100%’score means being among 
the 10% of best performing countries in the 
world. A 0-10% score means being among the 
worst scoring countries globally. 
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 Data are available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resour
ces.htm. This website contains information about 
all countries of the world as well as interactive 
possibilities to extract, combine and report data 
and results.  
 Table 2:  WGI Indicators 11 Caricom States 
 
WGI INDICATORS 
2009 
COUNTRY 
INTEGRITY 
ANTI- 
CORRUPTION 
DEMOCRACY 
 
EFECTIVE-NESS  LAWFULL- 
NESS 
ARUBA 82.4 90.0 89.5 89.2 
BAHAMAS 90.0 79.1 81.0 72.6 
BARBADOS 86.7 86.7 91.4 81.6 
BELIZE 56.7 69.2 41.4 44.3 
GRENADA 67.1 72.5 62.9 59.0 
GUYANA 35.2 51.7 47.1 33.0 
HAITI 11.0 30.3  4.8  5.7 
JAMAICA 40.0 62.6 58.6 36.8 
NETHERLANDS 
ANTILLES 
76.2 58.3 74.3 76.9 
SURINAME 46.2 59.2 54.8 51.4 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
55.7 61.1 64.3 49.1 
     
Categories:  above 70%, between 30% en 50% en below 30% 
 
 
Table 3: Ranking 11 Caribbean States on Four Good Governance Indicators 
 
WGI INDICATORS 
2009 
COUNTRY 
INTEGRITY 
ANTI- 
CORRUPTION 
DEMOCRACY 
 
EFECTIVE-NESS  LAWFULL- 
NESS 
ARUBA 3 1 2 1 
BAHAMAS 1 3 3 4 
BARBADOS 2 2 1 2 
BELIZE 6 5 10 8 
GRENADA 5 4 6 5 
GUYANA 10 10 9 10 
HAITI 11 11  11  11 
JAMAICA 9 6 7 9 
NETHERLANDS 
ANTILLES 
4 9 4 3 
SURINAME 8 8 8 6 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
7 7 5 7 
 
Which of the 11 Caricom countries is performing 
best in ‘good governance’, combining the four 
criteria? When the rankings on the different 
criteria are combined by a simple contestable 
calculation, adding up the relative rankings, the 
following picture arises.   
Aruba and Barbados score best, followed by the 
Bahamas (green). Grenada, the Netherlands 
Antilles and Trinidad and Tobago are performing 
‘second best’, Belize, Jamaica and Suriname are 
in the ‘grey’ disputed area and Guyana and Haiti 
are worst performing (in red).  
 
 
 
 Table 4: Over-all Image of 11 Caribbean States on Good Governance Indicators 
 
WGI INDICATORS 
2009 
COUNTRY 
 
TOTAL 
RANK 
(Ranking 
total 4 
criteria) 
INTE-
GRITY  
DEMO-
CRACY 
 
EFFECTI
VE-NESS  
LAW-
FULL- 
NESS 
ARUBA 1-2 7 3 1 2 1 
BAHAMAS 3 11 1 3 3 4 
BARBADOS 1-2 7 2 2 1 2 
BELIZE 7 29 6 5 10 8 
GRENADA 4-5 20 5 4 6 5 
GUYANA 10 39 10 10 9 10 
HAITI 11 44 11 11  11  11 
JAMAICA 9 31 9 6 7 9 
NETHERLANDS 
ANTILLES 
4-5 20 4 9 4 3 
SURINAME 8 30 8 8 8 6 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
6 26 7 7 5 7 
 
 
I am presenting these data primarily as ‘food for 
thought’.  
As mentioned before, the research methods are 
disputable, it’s all about image and reputation 
which might differ from reality, but it also seems 
important to realize that ‘reputation matters’. 
 
Does corruption reputation matter? 
Why would or should a country bother about its 
governance reputation, and in particular its 
corruption reputation? Isn’t corruption and 
favoritism ‘facts of life’, almost impossible to 
eradicate, also because they are part of the 
existing culture and expectations?  
This not very unusual line of reasoning can be 
opposed with reference to the fact that systems 
of favoritism and corruption have enormously 
damaging consequences for politics, 
administration, economy and society, ánd that 
there are examples of states with promising 
successes in improving good governance.  
First, it is indisputable that there is a relationship 
between corruption and lack of governance and 
poverty. Experts dispute about the character of 
the causality: makes corruption a country more 
poor, or makes poverty a country more corrupt 
(Treisman, 2007
12
). Probably both are true, 
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 Treisman concluded (2007: 211): “Quite 
strong evidence suggests that highly developed, 
long-established liberal democracies, with a free 
and widely read press, a high share of women in 
government, and a history of openness to trade, 
are perceived as less corrupt. Countries that 
which makes it worthwhile to escape from the 
interrelationship between lack of good 
governance and poverty. 
It is also clear that corruption always damages 
societal interests. Corruption is stealing from the 
public (interests), favoring personal, family, 
party or group interests. Public services are 
harmed, in particular at the costs of the poor
13
 To 
quote former United Nations Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan in his statement on the adoption by 
                                                                   
depend on fuel exports or have intrusive business 
regulations and unpredictable inflation are 
judged more corrupt. Although the causal 
direction is usually unclear, instrumenting with 
income as of 1700 suggests higher development 
does cause lower perceived corruption. However, 
controlling for income, most factors that predict 
perceived corruption do not correlate with 
recently available measures of actual corruption 
experiences (based on surveys of business people 
and citizens that ask whether they have been 
expected to pay bribes recently). Reported 
corruption experiences correlate with lower 
development, and possibly with dependence on 
fuel exports, lower trade openness, and more 
intrusive regulations. The subjective data may 
reflect opinion rather than experience, and future 
research could usefully focus on experience-
based indicators”. Also: Lambsdorff, 2005 and 
De Graaf et al. 2010. 
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http://www.un.org/events/10thcongress/2088b.ht
m; 5-11-2010. 
 the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption: 
 
“Corruption hurts the poor 
disproportionately by diverting funds 
intended for development, undermining 
a government's ability to provide basic 
services, feeding inequality and 
injustice, and discouraging foreign 
investment and aid.”14   
Estimations of the damage of corruption vary, 
but on a global scale the amount always sums up 
to many billions. 
 
Additional to the mentioned effects of 
corruption, also corruption reputation as in the 
Corruption Perception index has effects of its 
own. When business leaders and risk consider a 
country corrupt, it can be expected that 
corporations and governments are reluctant to 
invest. “Corrupt practices drain government 
coffers, play havoc with free trade and scare 
away investors. The World Bank estimates that 
corruption can reduce a country's growth rate by 
0.5 to 1.0 percentage points per year. IMF 
research has shown that investment in corrupt 
countries is almost 5 per cent less than in 
countries that are relatively corruption-free”. 15 
 
Another effect concerns undermining the state 
and the trust of citizens in political and 
administrative institutions. These consequences 
can be far reaching. When the benefits of the 
state are only distributed to the elite, society can 
revolt (Egypt 2011). And when only specific 
(ethnic, political, regional) parts of the 
population benefit, this can lead to disruption, 
protest and even civil war because of the 
corrupted regime. 
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http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index
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What Might Be Bone to Promote Integrity and 
Control Corruption 
 
The next part of the paper puts safeguarding 
integrity and controlling corruption in the center 
of attention. What policies and institutions are 
available to achieve those aims? What 
experiences in other contexts and countries 
might be useful? 
 
The concentration on corruption and integrity 
means that the focus is more narrow than the 
sketched ‘good governance’ perspective. This 
limitation arises from practical reasons on the 
one hand. Research on effectiveness of 
institutions and policies is complicated and the 
work that is familiar to me centers around 
corruption and integrity. On the other hand, there 
is the thesis that controlling corruption is not 
only crucial for the improvement of governance, 
but that it also offers a starting point for that 
improvement. This is illustrated by international 
organizations as the UN and the World Bank. 
Their policies are on good governance, specific 
activities and demands concentrate on anti-
corruption (Klein Haarhuis, 2005). 
 
Easy answers are not available and an over-all 
picture is absent. What I will try do, is give a 
first impression of some of the research that has 
been done, leading to a number of lessons that 
might be relevant, also for countries in the 
Caribbean. 
 
Research on Effective Integrity Systems 
 
The last years work has been done by researchers 
on the institutions and policies meant to curb 
corruption and to safeguard integrity. Among 
them are 1. the international comparative work 
on specific anti-corruption agencies by 
ANCORAGE-NET, a leading research network 
on anti-corruption agencies committees and 
bureaus
16
 and 2. the description and evaluation 
of many National Integrity Systems (putting anti-
corruption institutions in context) and a related 
(Local Integrity System) project on anti-
corruption systems in metropolitan areas.  
 
To present an illustration of this research, I will 
first summarize very briefly the history of an 
Anti corruption institution which is considered 
successful, and then put this type of institution 
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 See http://ancorage-net.org.  
 into the context of the lessons to be learned from 
integrity system research.   
 
Hong Kong: what worked
17
 
 
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, Hong Kong was a city 
state, part of the United Kingdom, an enclave 
surrounded by the Peoples Republic of China, 
with a reputation of ‘rampant corruption’. This 
conflicted with the ambition to become one of 
the leading financial centers in Asia which 
resulted in the establishment of the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption. It was 
recognized from the beginning that prevention 
was as important as the deterrent of prosecution, 
and the battle against corruption could only be 
won by changing people's attitude towards graft. 
ICAC is famous for that ‘three-pronged 
strategy’: Law Enforcement, Corruption 
Prevention and Community Education. ICAC is 
also special because it also addresses corruption 
in the private and business sector.  
The strategy is effective in ICAC’s eyes and 
remains its guiding strategy. Serviced by a 
central Administration Branch, three independent 
departments take care of the activities.  
Serviced by a central Administration Branch, 
three interdependent departments organize the 
activities. The Operations Department receives, 
considers and investigates alleged corruption 
offences (including anonymous reports). This 
department is by far the largest. The Corruption 
Prevention Department examines practices and 
procedures of government departments and 
public bodies to reduce corruption opportunities 
and offers free and confidential corruption 
prevention advice to private organizations upon 
request. The Community Relations Department 
educates the public against the evils of 
corruption and enlists public support in 
combating corruption. 
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 For example Law 2008, Cheung, 2008. Also: 
http://www.icac.org.hk/en/home/index.html. 
 Figure 4: ICAC Hong Kong
18
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The comprehensiveness of the strategy included 
the investment of a lot of resources into ICAC. 
In 2010 ICAC has about 1200 staff (on a 
population of seven million).  
The success of the strategy shows in the Hong 
Kong’s score in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index. HK was nr. 13 in 
2010, scoring 8.4 (1-10 scale), better than all 
Caribbean countries (Barbados being seen as 
least corrupt among them with 7.8). Hong Kong 
became the financial center it strived for, with a 
positive reputation as successful corruption 
fighter. Remarkably, the transition to the 
People’s Republic of China in 1997, under the 
principle of ‘one country, two systems’, did not 
change that reputation (China’s CPI is 3.5). 
 
One remark should be added to the success story 
though. The apparent success in the Asian 
context of a city state with financial ambitions 
and specific social and cultural does not mean 
that the model is wise elsewhere. Hong Kong’s 
development towards more prosperity makes the 
huge investment in anti-corruption an 
understandable and profitable one, but there are 
not many states that can afford this type of 
investment. 
 
National Integrity Systems
19
 
 
Since the beginning of this century on many 
countries assessments have been published about 
their National Integrity Systems.
20
 The NIS 
perspective was developed by Transparency 
International and Jeremy Pope as a model to use, 
describe and evaluate what countries can do and 
do to fight corruption and to safeguard integrity. 
The overall goal of the NIS model is to promote 
the integrity of governance in society. It is 
summarized in Figure  5. The model is built on 
and sustained by foundations, which comprise 
public awareness and society’s values. If public 
awareness is high and values are strong, they 
will support the pillars, which rest on them. On 
the other hand, if the public is apathetic and not 
watchful, or if the values are widely lacking, 
then the foundations will be weak. On top of the 
roof are three round balls; they represent 
important principles, including sustainable 
development of effective and efficient public 
services, government functioning under law and 
quality of life. These goals reflect the broad 
significance of NIS systems for countries, 
including developing countries. 
 
The pursuit of the goals of the NIS is rooted in 
the conviction that all of the issues of 
contemporary concern in the area of governance 
– capacity development, results orientation, 
public participation, and the promotion of 
national integrity – need to be addressed in an 
integrated or holistic fashion. The NIS approach 
works through a number of crucial institutions, 
sectors or activities – the pillars. These include 
the political will to fight corruption, an active 
parliament to attain and sustain good governance 
and to fight corruption, an auditor-general as 
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  The NIS description is based on Huberts, 
Anechiarico and Six, 2008, 5-7. For more 
detailed information about the NIS-model,see the 
website of Transparency International, the 
leading international non-governmental 
organization devoted to combating corruption, 
that developed and promoted the concept of NIS: 
www.transparency.org and; Pope, J. (Ed), 1996, 
National Integrity Systems: the TI Sourcebook. 
Berlin: Transparency International. 
www.transparency.org and; Pope, J. (Ed), 1996, 
National Integrity Systems: the TI Sourcebook. 
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 watchdog over financial integrity, an attorney 
general as ‘guardian of the public interest’, a 
public service system designed to protect the 
public decision-making process, the judiciary 
and the protection of the rule of law, an 
ombudsman, independent anti-corruption 
agencies, adequate procedures for public 
procurement, accounting and financial 
management, a private sector operating within 
the laws and public awareness, media, civil 
society and international organizations 
supportive of ethics and integrity.  
The NIS also encourages the pillars to work 
together, as stakeholders in developing a plan 
and assessing ‘the systemic identification of gaps 
and weaknesses, as well as opportunities for 
strengthening or augmenting each of these pillars 
into a coherent framework’ (Pope, 1996) – in 
terms of interrelationships, interdependence and 
combined effectiveness in a ‘holistic approach’. 
Pillars are not necessarily of equal strength but 
the overall impact can be achieved through over-
compensation by certain pillars (for example, a 
proactive anti-corruption agency offsetting weak 
investigative journalism).  
 
In the NIS approach the main criterion for 
judging the quality of the system, although often 
only implicitly, is the completeness of the 
system; are all pillars and elements of the NIS 
present? This approach was taken by Doig and 
McIvor (Transparency International, 2001) in 
their study of many national integrity systems.
21
 
Figure 5: Elements of a National Integrity 
System  (Source: Pope  1996) 
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 See also n interesting substudy by the same 
authors on the small islands in the Caribbean: 
Doig and McIvor, 2004.  
  
 
 
An additional conclusion Doig and McIver came 
to, based on 18 country studies (2003: 330-331), 
was that   
“the NIS provides the basis of an adaptive 
approach in terms of means and measurable in 
terms of  performance and impact as well as in 
terms of progress, across institutions, countries 
and time, and in identifying good practice in 
operation. Updating country reports and 
comparing inter-institutional and inter-country 
progress gives the impetus to avoid becoming 
too engaged in the process—combating 
corruption—at the expense of the purpose 
building toward the delivery of the ultimate NIS 
objectives.  
 
Such an approach has a universal resonance, 
articulated by Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of 
Barbados, in June 1999 when he called for ‘a 
new form of governance’: 
 
After 30 years of independence, the 
State cannot retreat as a force for good 
in Caribbean development. It must 
redefine its purposes. It must refocus its 
strategic vision. It must reform its way 
of doing business. It must reinvent itself 
to be relevant to today’s purposes and 
tomorrow’s needs. It must build new 
strategic alliances with the private 
sector, the non-governmental 
institutions, and all the institutions of 
our civil society to create a new 
Caribbean, ordered in accordance with 
the precepts of a just and equitable and 
good society . . . 
It can also reasonably be argued that 
there has, in our region, been too 
destructive a competition for political 
office; too heavy a concentration of 
power in the hands of the ruling elites, 
an unhealthy preservation of 
antidevelopmental party and tribal 
divisions, a focus on short-term partisan 
political concerns rather than longterm 
strategic objectives, an efficient 
patronage and spoils systems which 
work against sound and progressive 
Government . . . 
It surely must be the mission of this 
generation to make consensus building 
the foundation of a new form of 
Governance; to make popular and 
effective participation and inclusion, the 
key facets of our political culture, and 
to fashion a society in which the 
people’s business and the Government’s 
business are one and the same thing . . . 
(Commonwealth Innovations, 1999, pp. 
8, 9). 
 
The OECD’s (2000) focus in ethics 
infrastructure identifies similar actors at the 
national level (such as legislature, executive, 
judiciary, auditor-general, ombudsman, 
watchdog agencies and civil society), but does 
not follow the Pope’s temple metaphor. 
The Australian NISA approach actually replaces 
the Greek temple approach advocated by 
 Transparency International with a bird’s nest 
metaphor for a more interdependent network 
representation (Sampford et al., 2005). TI’s 
temple metaphor suggests that the whole temple 
is as strong as the weakest pillar, while the 
Australian NISA’s bird’s nest metaphor suggests 
that ‘a multitude of often weak institutions and 
relationships can combine to more effectively 
protect and promote the fragile goal of public 
integrity’ (Sampford et al., 2005: 96). Their 
research suggests that the cumulative 
interrelationships may be more important than 
the individual institutions, which is suggested by 
the temple metaphor. 
 
Local Integrity Systems 
 
Building upon the work done on national 
integrity systems, VU University developed an   
international comparative study on local integrity 
systems, paying attention to the policies, 
practices and actors at the local government level 
that aim to fight corruption and safeguard 
integrity (Huberts, Anechiarico & Six, 2008). 
For seven big cities or metropolitan areas the LIS 
was described an evaluated: Sydney/New South 
Wales, New York, Hong Kong, London, 
Hamburg, Amsterdam and Antwerp.  
 
A number of conclusions and lessons learned 
were ‘Pay Attention’ and ‘Involve Leadership’, 
‘Create Central Integrity Agency’, ‘Aim at All 
(including politicians)’, ‘Balance Types of 
Strategies’ and ‘Reflect on Effectiveness’. These 
‘lessons’ will be the starting points for a 
concluding reflection on the development of 
‘Caribbean Integrity Systems’. 
 
What To Do in Caricom: Bold Suggestions 
 
Of course, the framework that was sketched and 
the presented preliminary research results about 
good governance and corruption control, cannot 
be translated into simple conclusions on ‘what to 
do’ in the Caribbean. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of conclusions follow, as 
bold suggestions, as ‘food for thought’. 
 
Comparison and hope 
 
First, the data on good governance indicators 
including corruption control of a number of 
countries in the Caribbean seem to make it 
worthwhile to further reflect on the quality of 
governance, also in a comparative perspective. 
Countries differ (a lot) and subcategories might 
learn a lot from the presence and evaluation of 
policies and institutions that seem to work. This 
potential also becomes evident when it is taken 
into account that the reputation of countries is all 
but stable. Improvement is possible.  
Therefore I will finish with a suggestion 
concerning a ‘CIS’initiative, connecting 
researchers and policymakers in this area with 
the aim to learn (knowledge) and to learn from 
each others experiences (policy).  
 
Leadership 
 
Second, the involvement of leadership is crucial 
for the credibility and effectiveness of good 
governance and corruption control policies and 
institutions.  
 
A problem always is that curbing favoritism and 
corruption has a prisoner’s dilemma character. 
When a party is in power, it has no incentives to 
curb corrupt benefits of the state for their own 
supporters (to govern better), when there is no 
agreement with the opposing party to do the 
same when they come to power. Standard 
practice is to accuse the ‘others’ of corruption 
and bad governance, to preach good governance 
and integrity and in practice to continue 
favoritism and patronage. 
 
From both sides statesmanship is requested, from 
government and opposition, in everybody’s 
interest in the longer run, but statesmanship is 
exceptional. 
 
More often outside pressure seems necessary to 
end grand corruption by (succeeding) elites. This 
can come from big scandal and or national 
uprising and revolution in particular against 
dictatorships (see the Arabic world) or from 
external international pressure (IMF, WB, UN, 
but these outside organizations are seldom in the 
position to do that with credibility and 
effectiveness).  
 
Vision 
 
A comprehensive vision on corruption is 
important to make the fight against it successful. 
Too often policies concentrate on specific groups 
as for example (petty corruption by parts of) the 
civil service, and others are excluded (most often 
grand corruption by politicians). Such a 
selectivity is by definition disastrous for the 
effectiveness of the policy. Additionally, it might 
 be wise to include the private and business sector 
in policies, as Hong Kong and its ambition 
showed. 
 
Another aspect is that corruption is a multi-
faceted phenomenon and in many societies it’s 
more about favoritism and conflict of interest 
than on large scale theft and bribing.
22
 
 
A last and very important element is that we are 
dealing not only with what is wrong but also 
with integrity and values in a positive sense. 
Policies should include a description of the 
values to be promoted as well as prevention and 
education. The UN Code of Conduct for Public 
Officials
23
 offers examples of the values as 
loyalty to the public interest, efficiency, 
effectiveness and integrity, lawfulness, 
attentiveness, fairness and impartiality. 
 
Organization and strategy 
 
The organization of integrity and anti-corruption 
is relevant as well. An independent Central 
Integrity Agency that collects, investigates and 
punishes violations, possibly in combination 
with prevention and education, is often 
mentioned as a success factor.  
Many strategies and policies can be used to 
control corruption and to safeguard integrity. 
Two basic strategies are often distinguished: 
compliance strategies based on rules and 
sanctions and value or integrity strategies based 
on motivation, consciousness and prevention 
(Trevino et al, 1999). Both are necessary to curb 
corruption, as also the example of Hong Kong’s 
ICAC indicated.  
 
Towards a CIS Project on ‘Caricom Integrity 
Systems’? 
 
There are research projects available focusing on 
national and local integrity systems. Pure 
descriptions of institutions, policies and 
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with Conventions, Declarations and Other 
Instruments  
Found in General Assembly Resolutions. 
innovations are often not very convincing, 
though. Comparison is the starting point for 
knowledge as well as policy development, which 
was the basis of the sketched local integrity 
system project (with the involvement of policy-
makers and researchers, a new and stimulating 
format). My concluding suggestion is simple. A 
comparable project for the national integrity 
systems of Caricom countries might lead to the 
same type of learning (knowledge and practice).  
 
A ‘CIS’ project would bring together (a number 
of) Caricom countries, asking them to describe 
their institutions and policies in line with a 
format to be presented and add a self-evaluation 
as well as inviting independent researchers from 
the countries to evaluate that system. Such an 
endeavor could be very relevant for theory and 
practice. 
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